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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for damages resulting 
from the spillage by Appellant, Louis A. Roser Company's, 
agent of a goat serum conjugate developed for commercial 
laboratory diagnostic purposes. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
In December, 1977, a District Court jury found 
that Respondent, Gull Laboratories, Inc. 's, damages 
amounted to $65,197.00 and that said damages resulted 
70% from the negligence of Roser Company. Judgment was 
entered for Gull Laboratories in the amount of $45,637.90, 
plus costs. Roser Company's motion for a new trial was 
denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant, Louis A. Roser Company, seeks a 
reversal of the judgment of the lower court and a new trial 
on all issues. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The incident giving rise to this lawsuit 
occurred at Gull Laboratories, Inc. in Sandy, Utah, in 
the latter part of February, 1976. Dr. Myron W. Wentz is 
the director and principal stockholder of that organization. 
Gull Laboratories, Respondent herein, had 
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engaged in scientific research from 1974 until the 
incident in question in 1976, developing a unique goat 
serum conjugate for use by hospitals, clinics and labo-
ratories in a test kit to be used in diagnosing certain 
diseases. (R497). 
In February, 1976, the kits were nearing readi-
ness for introduction on the connnercial market (R506) when 
the walk-in cooler in which the conjugate was being stored 
became defective, causing a potentially harmful tempera-
ture rise in the cooler. (R528, 697). Dr. Wentz called 
Fur Breeders Agricultural Cooperative, from whom Gull 
Laboratories leased the laboratory. Fur Breeders sent 
representatives who entered the cooler to check the 
refrigeration tmit. (R593). They neither discovered the 
defect nor caused any damage to the conjugates or reagents 
stored in the cooler. (R528, 720-24). 
Subsequently, Fur Breeders called Louis A. Roser 
Company and asked Roser Company to send someone to repair 
the tmit. Roser Company then sent their "lead serviceman'' 
(R676) to the laboratory on a Friday afternoon in February, 
1976. Mr. Meyer, the repairman, testified that he wore 
corrective lenses because of cataracts and that his vision 
was a little fuzzy or cloudy (R653-54) and that he suffered 
from nerve deafness, making it difficult for him to hear. 
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(R658-59). There is a conflict of testimony concerning 
how he got to the cooler; he claims he went to the cooler 
without anyone showing him to it. (R659). However, it 
is uncontested that when he left, a flask containing the 
goat serum conjugate, the result of months of research 
and development, was tipped over and the conjugate lost 
due to spillage. (R536, 672a-73a, 693, 702). Meyer left 
the laboratory, he spoke to no one and thereafter denied 
any negligence or responsibility (R667-668) in the spillage 
of the conjugate. The jury in its verdict determined 
the facts to be otherwise. 
Roser Company claims that the evidence is 
conflicting as to whether the conjugate was totally lost. 
(Brief of Appellant, Page 9). In fact, the only direct 
testimony by eye witnesses was to the effect that virtually 
all of the conjugate was spilled. (R538). In rebuttal, 
a competitor of Gull Laboratories, Dr. Muna, (R710a) 
testified that it might not have been a total loss, even 
though he was not a witness to the spillage. There is, in 
fact, no evidence that Dr. Muna was ever in Gull Laboratories 
at all. 
Dr. Wentz innnediately called Fur Breeders who 
said they would get him in touch with the proper people. 
(R538-39). Soon thereafter, a representative of Roser's 
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insurance company met with Dr. Wentz and prepared a three 
page estimate of what Dr. Wentz then thought it might cost 
to reproduce the spilled conjugate. (R578-82). A single 
page of that estimate, Exhibit D-16, was introduced by 
Roser Company as evidence of Gull Laboratories' loss. 
(R581). At the trial, Dr. Wentz testified that the actual 
cost of reproducing the conjugate came to $65,197.00. 
He testified as to specific costs making up that figure 
(R559-61) and Roser Company had the opportunity to cross-
examine him concerning the component and total cost. 
(R577-78). Exhibit P-13 was introduced as an itemization 
of those figures. Whether the actual loss was the amount 
contained in the insurance company's estimate, Exhibit D-16 
or the amount testified to by Dr. Wentz from actual 
experience and itemized in Exhibit P-13, was a question of 
fact which was decided by the jury in favor of Gull 
Laboratories. 
Roser Company has claimed that it was surprised 
by the testimony of Dr. Wentz regarding the actual amount 
of damages. (Brief of Appellant, Page 23). Roser Company 
had made no effort to discover this amount, even after Dr. 
Wentz stated in his deposition in November, 1976, that he 
had spent considerable time and money to replace the lost 
conjugate. Contrary to Roser Company's contention, (Brief 
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of Appellant, Page 28) attempts to reirnmunize the animals 
began in March, 1976, and continued throughout the summer. 
(R557). Wentz further stated that his attempt to render 
conjugates adequate for his purposes was" ... the thrust 
of my efforts since the accident, since the loss of the 
other material." (R272). Roser Company made no formal 
or informal requests to examine the records of Gull 
Laboratories concerning the loss resulting from the spillage 
and the resultant damages at anytime prior to trial. 
Such information could have been readily provided by 
Dr. Wentz since he personally directed the work of 
recovery (R556-59) and, contrary to the contention of 
Roser Company (Brief of Appellant, Page 18), he kept the 
records of Gull Laboratories' operations. (R577). A 
statement made by Roser Company's counsel before the jury 
on this subject was somewhat misleading. The court asked 
if Exhibit P-13 was a summation of what was on the books 
and records of Gull Laboratories. When Mr. Richman replied 
that it was, Roser's counsel said, (R560, lines 5-6): 
MR. BERRY: I don't think its on the books 
and records, Your Honor. I 
haven't seen it on the books. 
The implication was that he had reviewed the books 
and records and had not found that information. The fact is, 
he had never seen those records because he had never asked 
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to see. them prior to that moment. Those records, neverthe-
less, existed and were prepared by and under the direction 
of Dr. Wentz who was able to give competent testimony 
concerning their contents. 
ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has said, in Crellin v. 
Thomas, 122 Utah 122, 247 P.2d 264 (1952): "The granting 
of a new trial should never be merely capricious and 
arbitrary, but should only be done when sound judicial 
discretion, in the interest of doing justice between the 
parties, so requires." Rule 59(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure defines the limits of such discretion, 
stating that the following are the pertinent grounds for 
granting a new trial: 
Rule 59(a) Grounds 
* * * 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary 
prudence could not have guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for 
the party making the application, which he 
could not, with reasonable diligence, have 
discovered and produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appear-
ing to have been given under the influence 
of passion or prejudice. 
-6-
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(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify 
the verdict or other decision, or that it is 
against the law. 
(7) Error in law. 
Granting a new trial for reasons not circum-
scribed by the above mentioned rule would "prostitute the 
constitutional trial by jury." See Jensen v. Denver & R. 
G. Ry. Co., 138 Pac. 1185, 1192 (Utah, 1914); Uptown 
Appliance & Radio Co., Inc. v. Flint, 122 Utah 298, 249 
P.2d826 (1952). 
POINT I 
THERE WAS NO ERROR COMMITTED BY THE COURT 
IN RECEIVING EXHIBIT P-13 IN EVIDENCE. 
Roser Company claims that Gull Laboratories is 
"now estopped to deny its claim that P-13 is a summary 
and is consequently bound by the law pertaining thereto." 
(Brief of Appellant, Page 15). Whether that exhibit was 
or was not a summary is immaterial and Gull Laboratories can 
certainly not be estopped from claiming other grounds 
for the propriety of such evidence. Roser Company claims 
that such exhibit was improperly admitted as violating 
the best evidence rule. However, it is clear as set forth 
in 2 JONES, EVIDENCE, §7.4 (6th ed., 1972), p. 96, that the 
best evidence rule does not apply: 
§7.4. Distinction Between Proof of Contents 
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and Proof of Facts Asserted in Writing. -
While the instrument itself is the best 
evidence, and, if available, the only 
evidence of what it contains, it often 
happens that the recitals of the instrument 
are hearsay, such as the narration of events 
in a letter. In such cases the writing 
itself is not admissible to prove the truth 
of its recitals unless it can qualify under 
an exception to the hearsay rule. Thus 
two distinct rules are involved, thec5ne 
relating to proof of what the instrument 
contains and the other relatin to the 
pro ative e ect o its recitals. The best 
evidence rule a lies onl in the case of 
t e So i the writin is admissible 
to acts w ic are recited therein, 
not ave greater weig t t an 
ru e oes not a , an oral 
testimony an the writing are equally 
admissible except as limitations may be 
imposed by some other exclusionary rule of 
evidence. 
Furthermore, there is no preferential 
rule which requires the production of the 
writing if the fact to be proved is an 
independent fact to which the writing is 
merely collateral or circumstantially 
relevant .... " (Emphasis added). 
The legal principal thus stated has been followed 
generally in jurisdictions throughout the United States. 
Illustrative of this is an Illinois case where the Plaintiff 
attempted to show certain expenses as damages. It will 
be noted that in this case, Respondent introduced Exhibit 
P-13 also to show certain expenses as damages. The Illinois 
court stated in Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust 
Company of Chicago v. Eastern Illinois Water Co., 31 Ill. 
App. 3rd 148, 334 N.E.2d 96, 105-06 (1975): 
-8-
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At the trial, in order to prove 
expenses incurred by plaintiffs as a result 
of defendant's default on the mortgage, 
plaintiffs introduced a number of letters 
which had been sent to defendant by plain-
tiffs. The letters were nothing more than 
written notice of expenses which plaintiffs 
claimed pursuant to one or more provisions 
of the mortgage. Defendant at the trial 
objected to the admission of the exhibits 
as not competent because not the best 
evidence. The exhibits were admitted 
over defendant's objections. On this 
appeal defendant renews its contention 
that the exhibits were incompetent because 
not the best evidence .... 
Defendant misunderstands the purpose 
and application of the best evidence rule. 
The best evidence rule applies only when the 
contents or terms of a writin~ are in 
issue and are, therefore, toe roved. 
Citations . In the instant case t e issue 
was not the contents of a writing but 
rather the amount of ex~enses that had 
been incurred b laintiffs. The best 
evidence ru e oes not a~p y where a ~arty 
seeks to rove a fact whictlhas an existence 
in eten ent o any writing, even though 
theact might have been reduced to, or is 
evidenced by, a writing." (Citations). 
(Emphasis added). 
It is clear that the principles set forth in 
JONES and Continental Illinois are applicable to the question 
before this court and that it is a misapprehension of 
the issues to contend that Exhibit P-13 is not admissible 
because it does not meet the requirements as an exception 
to the best evidence rule. In Schiltz v. Cullen-Schiltz 
& Associates, Inc., 228 N.W.2d 10, 19-20 (Iowa, 1975), 
-9-
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plaintiff tendered a "rundown" of costs and wages. The 
defendant contended that the plaintiff had in his posses-
sion receipts, vouchers, agreements or some form of 
written evidence which would better prove the elements 
of damage he testified to. On appeal, the court disagreed, 
saying: 
The authors of McCormick on Evidence 
(Second Ed.), Section 229, say, "the only 
actual rule that the 'best evidence' phrase 
denotes today is the rule requiring the 
production of the writing." 
Rule of best evidence obtainable is 
expressly, if not solely, applicable to 
documentary evidence, (Citation), and has no 
application where the fact to be proved is 
independent of any writing even though the 
fact has been reduced to a writing or is 
evidenced by a writing. (Citations). 
The rule excludes testimony designed 
to establish the terms of a document, and 
requires the document's production instead, 
but does not exclude testimony which 
concerns the document without aiming to 
establish its terms. (Citations). 
In Lin Manufacturing Company of Arkansas v. 
Courson, 436 S.W.2d 472 (Ark. 1969), the court quoted 
McKelvey on Evidence, 1944 Ed., at §345 as saying: 
"There is a distinction between proving a fact which has 
been put in writing and proving the writing itself. Because 
a fact has been described in writing does not exclude other 
proof of the fact." (Emphasis added). 
The trial court was aware of the distinction 
-10-
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between the issues as perceived by Roser Company and as 
they actually were. Roser Company's objection was based 
on the best evidence rule. Objection was made to the 
introduction of P-13 as follows: 
MR. BERRY: Your honor, I object to P-13 
as not being the best evidence 
of the books and move his answer 
be stricken as not responsive 
as to showing that he had informa-
tion firsthand on which he could 
make this summary. 
The court responded as follows: 
THE COURT: Based on that objection, I'll 
overrule it; the exhibit may be 
admitted. (R561). 
It appears, as in the Continental Illinois 
case that Roser Company "misunderstands the purpose and 
application of the best evidence rule ... In the instant 
case the issue was not the contents of a writing but rather 
the amount of expenses that had been incurred by plaintiff." 
In such a case, the best evidence rule is inapplicable and 
we need not concern ourselves with compliance with the 
requirements for allowing an exception thereto. The writing, 
Exhibit P-13, was as admissible as evidence as the oral 
testimony of Dr. Wentz concerning the subject matter covered 
by the writing. 
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POINT II 
EVEN IF EXHIBIT P-13 WERE INADMISSIBLE, 
RECEIVING IT AS EVIDENCE WOULD ONLY BE 
HARMLESS ERROR. 
Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, reads: 
No error in either the admission or 
the exclusion of evidence, and no error or 
defect in any ruling or order or in anything 
done or admitted by the court or by any 
of the parties, is ground for granting a new 
trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment 
or order, unless refusal to take such action 
appears to the court inconsistent with sub-
stantial ·ustice. The court at ever sta e 
o t e rocee in must isre ar error 
or e ect in t e procee ing w ic oes not 
affect the substantial rights of the parties. 
(Emphasis added). 
Exhibit P-13 itemized the costs of reproduction 
of the lost conjugate. Oral testimony could properly 
have been, and in fact was·, presented by Dr. Wentz 
concerning such costs. Company records were maintained 
by Dr. Wentz and the costs were incurred in work performed 
under his direction. He was qualified to express his 
knowledge verbally concerning the value of material and 
labor involved. Such evidence could properly have been, 
and was, placed before the jury by oral testimony. The 
acceptance of Exhibit P-13, even if erroneous, could have 
had very little effect, if any, on the substantial rights 
of the Roser Company. Its acceptance by the court was not 
inconsistent with the substantial justice required by Rule 61. 
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POINT III 
ORDINARY PRUDENCE WOULD HAVE ENABLED 
ROSER COMPANY TO KNOW UPON WHAT FACTS 
GULL LABORATORIES BASED ITS CLAIM FOR 
RELIEF 
Roser Company's counsel, who introduced Exhibit 
D-16, which Gull Laboratories' counsel had never seen, 
without prior indication to Gull Laboratories that he 
would do so, complains that he was surprised by Gull 
Laboratories' introduction of Exhibit P-13. Exhibit 
D-16 was an estimate prepared before the fact, of what Dr. 
Wentz thought it would cost to reproduce the conjugate. 
It was prepared for the purpose of making a claim against 
the Roser Company's insurance company. Although it was 
rejected by Roser Company, Roser Company contends now that 
the figures contained in that estimate are more reasonable 
than the actual costs of reproduction, precisely determined 
after the fact. If such were the case, it might be ordinary 
prudence to neglect the normal and ordinary discovery 
procedures available to all parties to a lawsuit, e.g., 
interrogatories and production of documents. However, it is 
difficult to believe that for the purpose of computing 
damages, an ordinarily prudent person would accept an 
estimate of costs to be incurred as more reliable and accurate 
than a statement of costs actually incurred. 
It is very cormnon practice to ask opposing parties 
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upon interrogatories, to state the evidentiary basis for 
any claim or defense which they propose to present at 
trial. However, no interrogatory of any kind was served 
upon Gull Laboratories in preparation for the trial of this 
matter. Furthermore, Roser Company did not move, formally 
under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, or informally by 
a request directly to Gull Laboratories or its counsel 
for production of any record of any kind kept by Gull 
Laboratories. It can scarcely be argued under such circum-
stances that ordinary prudence was exercised in that aspect 
of Roser Company's trial preparation. 
Roser Company cites at length from Crellin v. 
Thomas, supra, in support of its claim that a new trial 
should be granted because ordinary prudence could not have 
guarded against the receipt of Exhibit P-13. There are 
adequate legal and factual distinctions to disregard that 
case in this matter. In Crellin, there was no allegation 
that one party had surprised the other with evidence 
presented at trial. The party moving for the new trial had, 
in fact, discovered new evidence after the trial that would 
have helped its case at the trial. It is true that the 
trial court granted a new trial and was upheld on appeal 
although it was noted that the moving party might have 
discovered the evidence through Rule 33 discovery. In 
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that case, the Defendant was sued for slander after calling 
the Plaintiff a whore. The newly discovered evidence 
tended to prove that she was, and the Supreme Court obviously 
recognized the injustice involved in permitting the plaintiff 
to recover a verdict. It held that the trial court had 
not abused its discretion in allowing a new trial. No 
such injustice would result in this case. Furthermore, 
this case is not governed by Crellin in that no new evidence 
has been proffered. 
Roser Company's counsel cites testimony of Dr. 
Wentz (Brief of Appellant, Page 16) in his deposition and 
at the trial to show that he was surprised by the introduc-
tion of evidence that the cost to reproduce the conjugate 
was $65,197.00. However, Dr. Wentz' deposition (R271) clearly 
puts Roser Company on notice that such costs were not minimal. 
After testifying about having discovered a conjugate that 
could be obtained from a cotmnercial supplier, the following 
exchange took place: 
Q. Did you know about the availability 
of that anti-human gobulin product 
from the Baltimore laboratory before 
you had this accident? 
A. No, I did not. I had to determine 
myself and to work with the material 
m self to make it acce table for use 
in the product. Emphasis ad ed . 
After asking several questions concerning the 
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methodology of making the material acceptable, this 
exchange concluded as follows: (R272). 
Q. How much labor and time did you 
spend at your lab, yourself, in 
working on this after the accident 
to render this material more specific 
for your purpose? 
A. This has been the thrust of my efforts 
since the accident, since the loss of 
the other material. (Emphasis added). 
The logical result of granting the relief sought 
by Roser Company on this appeal would be for attorneys to 
neglect all discovery in their trial preparation, and then 
request a new trial on the groi.md that all damaging 
evidence produced at the trial was a surprise. 
POINT IV 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY 
THE VERDICT AND THE DAMAGES AWARDED 
WERE NOT EXCESSIVE 
There was ample evidence presented to support 
the verdict and to sustain the award of damages. Roser 
Company's witnesses did counter much of Gull Laboratories' 
evidence but all evidence was before the jury and it found in 
favor of Gull Laboratories. 
Although Roser Company claims that "uncontroverted 
evidence given during the trial aptly illustrates Meyer's 
compliance ... [with the standard of care required of a 
reasonable and prudent person]", (Brief of Appellant, 
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Page 24), this ignores the facts as set forth at the trial. 
Mr. Carpenter, an employee of Gull Laboratories, 
testified to the careless habits of Roser Company's 
agent, Mr. Meyer and to the fact that he discovered the 
spillage after Meyer had left the walk-in refrigerator 
(R693) and that the conjugate had not been spilled prior 
to that time. (R694). 
This testimony was corroborated by Mrs. Wentz 
(R702) who was working in the office at the time the 
spillage occurred. In addition, Dr. Wentz testified 
in more detail concerning what appeared to be the careless 
habits of Meyer (R527-31) and the fact that the conjugate 
was intact prior to Meyer entering the refrigerator and 
that it was spilled and totally unsalvageable after he 
left (R531-38, 672a-73a). 
Although, as Roser Company points out, this 
evidence was challenged by statements of Meyer, the 
determination of this issue is within the responsibility 
of the jury and it, on the basis of the considerable 
evidence before it, decided this question of liability 
against Roser Company and in favor of Gull Laboratories. 
With respect to the contention that the award of 
damages was excessive upon the evidence, such a position, 
again, is not sustained by the record. Dr. Wentz testified 
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in great detail concerning the unique quality of his product 
(R544-52) and his efforts to reproduce the conjugate in a 
quality equal to that of the spilled conjugate (R556-59) and 
the costs involved in doing so (R559-61). The unique 
quality of Dr. Wentz' conjugate was corroborated by Dr. 
Spendlove, a virologist on the faculty at Utah State 
University, (R64la-45a) and Dr. Robbins, Supervisor of the 
Immuno Chemistry Lab at the L.D.S. Hospital in Salt Lake 
City. (R66la). 
Roser Company again countered this evidence con-
cerning damages with testimony from Dr. Wentz' competitor, 
Dr. Muna, and all of this evidence was properly before 
the jury. The jury exercised its prerogative to decide 
which evidence to believe and did so in favor of Gull 
Laboratories. 
CONCLUSION 
1. There was no error committed by the court 
below in receiving Exhibit P-13 in evidence. 
2. Even if Exhibit P-13 was inadmissible as 
evidence, only harmless error was committed because the 
evidence contained therein was properly before the jury in 
another form. 
3. Ordinary prudence would have enabled Roser 
Company to know upon what facts Gull Laboratories based its 
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claim for relief. 
4. The evidence was sufficient to justify the 
verdict and the damages awarded were not excessive. 
1978. 
TH DATED this //p day of I u N 1= 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHMAN, WRIGHT & WILKINS 
By ./lk f'Vt ~---0 
GLEN M. RICHMAN 
Attorney for Respondent 
79 South State Street, Suite 401 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-8844 
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